I construct an index of political polarization using seven previously proposed measures. I estimate the relative propensity for polarization across demographic groups in a regression framework and examine the extent to which demographic change can explain recent trends in polarization. Assuming fixed propensities for polarization, I estimate that 25 to 59 percent of the change in polarization between 1984 and 2016 can be attributed to demographic change in the United States. *
Introduction
The popular narrative and many academic studies suggest that the United States' electorate is becoming increasingly polarized. In 1994, 23 percent of Republicans were more liberal than the median Democrat and 17 percent of Democrats were more conservative than the median Republican based on an aggregation of ten policy questions. In 2017, only 1 percent of Republicans were more liberal than the median Democrat and only 3 percent of Democrats were more conservative than the median Republican (Kiley 2017) . Favorable feelings towards the opposing party are also at all time lows in recent years (Iyengar et al. 2012; Gentzkow 2016) .
Who or what is driving contemporary US political polarization? Numerous answers have been proposed for this question. These answers include, among others, Republicans or conservatives (Ornstein 2014), rising income inequality (McCarty et al. 2008) , the rise in foreign trade (Autor et al. 2016) , cable television (Martin and Yurukoglu 2017), the internet and social media (Sunstein 2017), increased ethnic diversity (Abramowitz 2014) , and changing religious beliefs (Abramowitz 2014) . In this paper, I examine the extent to which demographic change can explain recent trends in political polarization.
The United States has become increasingly educated and older in the last few decades (Ryan and Bauman 2016; Shrestha and Heisler 2011). Both of these demographic characteristics are highly correlated with political participation (Timpone 1998), and education is related to greater ideological prejudice (Henry and Napier 2017) . To examine the impact of these and related demographic changes, I take seven measures used in Boxell et al. (2017) , modify them so that they can be constructed separately for demographic groups of interest, and construct an index of polarization from these modified measures. The index of polarization increased by 35 percent between 1984 and 2016. I then use a regression framework to estimate the relative propensities for polarization across six different demographic categories: religious affiliation, work and income status, education, race, age, and gender. The regression framework controls for the fact that certain demographic groups may have higher rates of polarization because their affiliation is highly correlated with being a member of another demographic group.
This allows me to construct an estimate of the counterfactual level of polarization if propensities for polarization were held constant at their 1984 levels but the demographic composition of the United States were allowed to vary. I find that demographic change can explain 34 percent of the change in the index of political polarization. For the individual polarization measures, estimates range between 25 and 59 percent, with over a third of the change in partisan affect being accounted for by demographic change.
This work relates to a growing literature on political polarization. Much of the previous work has focused on documenting and debating whether polarization is increasing (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fiorina et al. 2010; Lelkes 2016) .
Other research examines how the different measures of political polarization are related to each other (Mason 2015) . Closest to this study is the work that examines the causes of political polarization. Previous work has examined the role of media (Prior 2013), income inequality (McCarty et al. 2008) , international trade (Autor et al. 2016) , and elite polarization (Fiorina and Abrams 2008) . This paper also relates to work using demographic differences to examine the credibility of proposed causes for political outcomes. Recent work use demographic differences in propensities to use the internet to argue that the internet is unlikely to be driving contemporary mass political polarization or to have altered the 2016 election outcome (Hampton and Hargittai 2016; Boxell et al. 2017; Boxell et al. 2018) . Some work has begun to look at differential polarization rates among Republicans and Democrats and argue the answer varies based on the measure used (Doherty 2014 ).
Data and polarization measures
The data come from the American National Election Studies (ANES) 1948-2012 Cumulative Data file and the ANES 2016 Time Series study. The ANES studies are nationally representative surveys that ask demographic and political questions. For consistency across years, I drop internet-based surveys that were conducted in 2012 and 2016, thus, restricting attention to faceto-face surveys. I also drop observations with missing or non-valid responses to any of the demographic questions used in section 3 and restrict the data to presidential election years.
Throughout, I weight responses using the type-0, face-to-face survey weights (VCF0009x) for respondents in 1996-2012 and the post-election, face-to-face survey weights (V160102f ) for 2016 respondents. I use seven measures taken from Boxell et al. (2017) and modify them so that they can be constructed at the individual respondent level. 1 I first construct a measure of the 'warmth' of feelings one has towards one's own party or ideological group on a scale of 0-100 relative to the opposing group. Partisan affect polarization is the difference between an individuals feelings towards their own party and that of the opposing party. For independents, the absolute value of the difference in feelings towards the two parties is used. I define a similar measure to measure relative warmth of feelings for one's own ideology using the difference between an individual's feelings towards their own ideological group and the opposing ideological group. Again, for moderates, the absolute value of the difference between the two groups is used. (1), moderate (0), or liberal (-1) and the absolute value of the sum of their responses indicates an individual's degree of ideological consistency. Finally, straight-ticket voting is an indicator for whether an individual reported voting for the same party (Republican or Democratic) in both the presidential and House elections. 3 Given these seven measures of political polarization, I construct a single index as follows. I normalize each of the seven measures by its standard deviation using respondents in 1984 with non-missing values for the polarization measure. I then take the average of these normalized measures to create an index defined at the individual level. Formally, for each individual i, I set
where σ m is the standard deviation of the measure m across respondents in 1984. Then for each measure (including the index), the weighted mean of the measure across respondents in year 2 Relative to Boxell et al. (2017) , I drop the question related to government provision of health insurance to decrease the number of missing responses. 3 See Online Appendix for the formal definition of each of these measures.
t gives the value of the measure for a given year. 4 By design, the index has been increasing steadily since 1984 and increased 35 percent over the entire period.
3 Results I examine differential propensities for polarization across six demographic categories: work and income status, religious affiliation, education levels, age, gender, and race. To control for intergroup correlations, I first estimate the following linear conditional mean model via weighted OLS
where M is a measure of polarization and X is a vector of indicators for various demographic characteristics 5 with coefficients β.
I estimate equation (1) 
Discussion and Conclusion
The above analysis assumes a political center and defines polarization as deviations from this center. For some polarization measures, this choice of center is arbitrary and different choices of "center" may give different counterfactual estimates. For other measures, such as partisan affect, the choice of center is well-defined and thus, less subject to this critique. The fact that the estimates for partisan affect align well with the overall index is reassuring.
The counterfactual analysis also assumes that polarization propensities across demographic groups are fixed at their 1984 levels. However, changing demographic composition may make certain demographic groups more or less extreme in response to perceived threats. To the extent to which demographic change increases polarization propensities, as some have suggested (Abramowitz 2014) , my estimates are conservative.
I show that demographic change may explain a nontrivial proportion of the recent rise in political polarization. This has two immediate implications. First, there is a smaller amount of polarization that needs to be explained by other mechanisms. Second, as demographics continue to shift towards demographic groups with higher propensities for polarization, we should expect the current upward trends in polarization to likewise continue. 
Polarization Measure Details
Denote an individual i's party and ideological alignment as P i and B i , respectively, which range from -3 (strong Democrat or liberal) to 3 (strong Republican or conservative). 1 Let R = {i : P i > 0} denote the set of Republican respondents and define D analogously. Similarly, I let C = {i : B i > 0} denote the set of conservative respondents and define L analogously. The formal definition of each of the individual polarization measures are:
Ideological affect for individual
3. Partisan sorting for individual i is (6 − |P i − B i |)(|P i | + 1)(|B i | + 1).
4.
Ideological polarization for individual i is |B i |.
5.
Perceived partisan-ideology polarization for individual i isR i −D i , whereR i denotes individual i's perception on how conservative Republicans are on a 7-point liberal-toconservative scale andD i is defined analogously.
6. Issue consistency for individual i is | k∈K k i |, where K denotes the set of policy questions and, for each k ∈ K, k i denotes a conservative (1), moderate (0), or liberal (-1) response to that question from respondent i.
7.
Straight-ticket voting is an indicator for whether individual i reported voting for the same party (Republican or Democratic) in both the presidential and House elections.
Demographic Indicator Details
I give a brief summary of the construction of the demographic indicators below. See ANES codebooks for exact question wording and changes in wording over the years. See replication code for exact construction.
constructed from the original sample. I then use these samples to construct the populationlevel measure of polarization, the demographic-based changes in polarization, the difference in demographic-based changes in polarization, and the proportion of the change in polarization explained by demographic change. Standard errors are then computed by taking the standard deviation of the values across the 100 bootstrap replicates.
